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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A KING NO MORE: THE IMPACT OF THE
PINOCHET DECISION ON THE DOCTRINE OF
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In a precedent setting decision in March 1999, the British House of Lords
rejected the head of state immunity claims of former Chilean leader Augusto
Pinochet for alleged acts of torture committed during his dictatorial reign in
Chile. The case began in the fall of 1998 when Spain requested Pinochet’s
extradition from Britain to prosecute him for genocide, torture, and the
disappearances of thousands of people.1 To many around the world, the
decision represented a major human rights victory and signaled a sea change
in the enforcement of international human rights law. The international
system, once based on notions of sovereignty and the horizontal equality of
all states, was giving way to a more vertical structure where all states were
subject to a hierarchy of fundamental human rights norms.2 With the
prospect of domestic courts taking a more active role in enforcing these
fundamental norms, the chances of egregious human rights abuses going
unpunished would be diminished.
The Pinochet decision also represented a dramatic shift in the doctrine of
head of state immunity. This centuries-old doctrine once gave heads of state
absolute immunity from prosecution for acts committed while serving as
head of state. The immunity even shielded them from prosecution after they
left office.3 Over the last century, however, the doctrine has eroded as courts
removed commercial and private transactions from its protection.4 The
Pinochet decision may further erode this doctrine, making the immunity
unavailable for certain types of criminal actions.5
The unavailability of this immunity for gross human rights violations will
remove an important roadblock in the “globalization” of human rights
1. Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM.
J. INT’L L. 452, 452 (1999).
2. See Christine M. Chinkin, In re Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 690, 711 (1999).
3. Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 314 (1999).
4. See Hazel Fox, Current Development, The First Pinochet Case: Immunity of a Former Head
of State, 48 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 207, 211 (1999).
5. See id.
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enforcement.6 Thus, the Pinochet decision sends a strong message to heads
of state who would use their power to commit human rights abuses.
Prosecutions of gross violations are no longer limited to the state where they
occur or the nationality of the majority of the victims,7 and violators can no
longer use immunity as a shield to protect themselves from criminal
responsibility.
Part II of this paper will trace the development of head of state immunity
and its status before the Pinochet decision in the House of Lords. Part III will
provide a background for the crimes that General Pinochet allegedly
committed during his dictatorial reign in Chile. Part IV will briefly explain
the grounds for the Spanish extradition request which set the stage for the
House of Lords decision. Part V will detail the House of Lords decision
holding that Pinochet did not have immunity as a former head of state from
prosecution for crimes under international law. Finally, Part VI will briefly
explain the possible ramifications of this decision on the doctrine of head of
state immunity and the future of human rights litigation.
II. THE HISTORY OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Head of state immunity is a doctrine grounded in customary international
law which grants a head of state immunity from prosecution in a foreign
state’s courts with respect to official acts taken by the head of state while in
power.8 Historically courts linked head of state immunity with the doctrine of
sovereign immunity9 because the head of state was once thought of as the
personification of the state.10 The roots of sovereign immunity are grounded
in the notion that one sovereign could not sit in judgment of another
sovereign because they had equal standing with each other.11 Today, the
rationale often cited for recognizing head of state immunity is the doctrine of
6. See Chinkin, supra note 2, at 711.
7. See id.
8. Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States Courts: Still
Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1055 (1995).
9. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “a foreign state is presumptively immune from
the jurisdiction of [foreign] courts . . .” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (discussing
sovereign immunity as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
10. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Has the Time Come to Revise the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act? 88 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. PRAC. 509, 512 (1994) (as reported by Mark S. Zaid, Sovereign
Immunity: A Comparative Perspective, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 509, 512 (1994)). The famous
remark of King Louis XIV of France, “L’etat, c’est moi” (I am the state), best represents this notion of
the state and the head of state being thought of as one and the same. Id. See also George, supra note 8,
at 1056.
11. Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of
Governments and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 52 (1994).
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comity.12 It is in the state’s best interests to safeguard the immunity of a
foreign head of state so that other states will afford equivalent protection to
its own head of state while abroad.13
As the twentieth century saw the world’s great empires crumble, the idea
of the sovereign being the personification of the state fell into disuse.14 As
notions of state and sovereign changed, the rationale for giving a head of
state absolute immunity also changed.15 As a result, various doctrines have
emerged with respect to the concept of head of state immunity.16 For
example, states have relied on sovereign immunity,17 diplomatic immunity,18
and the Act of State Doctrine19 when granting head of state immunity.20 Each
of these doctrines encompasses a varying degree of immunity, sometimes
with overlap.21 Due to the emergence of new rationales and exceptions, the
prevailing customary international law standard for head of state immunity
remains in a state of flux.22
Most exceptions to the general rule of absolute head of state immunity
12. See George, supra note 8, at 1061. See also id. at 1061 n.75 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40,
45 (2d Cir. 1988) (indicating that immunity is “founded on the need for mutual respect and comity
among foreign states”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir. 1987)
(stating that “the rationale of head of state immunity is to promote comity among nations”); Lafontant
v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Head of state immunity is also supported by the
doctrine of comity . . .”)).
13. See George, supra note 8, at 1061. Comity ensures that “leaders can perform their duties
without being subject to detention, arrest, or embarrassment in a foreign country’s legal system.” Id. at
1061 n.76 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1110).
14. See Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 513.
15. See Watts, supra note 11, at 52.
16. See id. at 54.
17. Britain grants a hybrid version of restrictive immunity that is grounded in both sovereign and
diplomatic immunity. See Mallory, infra note 20, at 177.
18. Diplomatic immunity is the doctrine that gives diplomats immunity from lawsuits in host
countries grants. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112. France, for example, bases its head of
state immunity on the sovereign’s status as a government official. This is more or less similar to
diplomatic immunity. See Mallory, infra note 20, at 177.
19. The Act of State Doctrine bars a state from reviewing the official acts of a foreign
government. See George, supra note 8, at 1056 n.38 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987)). The United States follows this doctrine, and it
prevents U.S. courts from reviewing acts of a foreign government. However, it affords little protection
to heads of state since courts have limited its application. See George, supra note 8, at 1056 n.38
(citing Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (“finding that the Act of State
Doctrine precluded an action against ex-Philippine President Marcos who was acting in his official
capacity as head-of-state”)).
20. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179 (1986).
21. See id.
22. See id.
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1583 Sison.doc 04/24/01   5:05 PM
1586 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:1583
arise in the field of civil and administrative jurisdiction.23 The trend in the
law has been to exempt from immunity a head of state’s commercial
transactions and other acts of a purely private character.24 Thus, an informal
distinction has arisen between a head of state’s official conduct and conduct
undertaken in his personal capacity.25 Courts will afford immunity to public
or official acts (jure imperii),26 but not to private or personal acts (jure
gestionis).27
The distinction, however, between official acts and personal acts is
sometimes far from clear.28 For example, a head of state’s conduct can be
unlawful or criminal.29 The concern then turns to whether such acts should
qualify as official acts or whether they should be considered performed in
personal capacity.30 Under one view, unlawful or criminal acts are simply
common crimes committed in a personal capacity, not official acts
warranting immunity.31 However, it is equally possible for a head of state to
commit a crime while using the machinery of his office to carry out his
functions as head of state.32 According to this view, if the criminal act was
carried out under the color of public authority, the head of state would be
immune from jurisdiction regardless of the legality of the act under the laws
of his own state.33
23. Watts, supra note 11, at 54.
24. See id. at 55. Britain, for example, follows a restrictive theory of head of state immunity. See
Mallory, supra note 20, at 177 n.35. English common law originally recognized absolute immunity for
heads of state. See id. (citing Sayce v. Ameer Ruler Sadig Mohammad Abbasi Bahawalpur State,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 390 (C.A.)). The passage of the State Immunity Act of 1978 changed this. See State
Immunity Act 1978, July 20, 1978; 17 I.L.M. 1123 [hereinafter “Immunity Act”] for a reprinted
version of the Act. The Act curtailed the immunity of heads of state with respect to proceedings
dealing with private commercial transactions and torts. See Mallory, supra note 20, at 177 n.35.
25. See Watts, supra note 11, at 55.
26. The Second Circuit provides a good definition of what acts are included in jure imperii. Jure
imperii are limited to (1) internal administrative acts, (2) legislative acts, (3) acts concerning the armed
forces, (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, and (5) acts involving public loans. See George, supra
note 8, at 1057 n.50 (citing Victory Transportation, Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. De Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965)).
27. See George, supra note 8, at 1057 n.50 (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976)). The International Law Commission adopted the distinction between
official and personal conduct in its 1991 Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property. See Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 30 I.L.M.
1554, 1565 (1991); Britain also adopted the distinction in its State Immunity Act of 1978. See
Immunity Act, supra note 24; Watts, supra note 11, at 55.
28. See Watts, supra note 11, at 55.
29. Id. at 56.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 56 (citing Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 33 I.L.R. 353 (1962)).
32. See id.
33. See Watts, supra note 11, at 56-57. The test for determining whether such conduct is public
or private is “whether the conduct was engaged in under color of or in ostensible exercise of the Head
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/8
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The problem of distinguishing between official and private conduct does
not arise for those states that have adhered to the view of absolute
immunity.34 For example, Russia has granted a broad degree of immunity to
heads of state and has consistently claimed absolute immunity in foreign
courts.35 The United States also seems to follow a view of absolute
immunity.36 However, the modern trend in the law indicates that a head of
state will not enjoy immunity in civil and administrative proceedings with
of State’s public authority.” Watts, supra note 11, at 56. The International Law Commission adopted
the test in its draft articles on State Responsibility. See Art. 10 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, [1975] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 59, art. 10, U.N.Doc:A/10010/Rev.1. The test has
typically been used in cases of state responsibility for unauthorized acts of state officials or military
personnel. See Watts, supra note 11, at 56 n.90.
34. See Watts, supra note 11, at 57.
35. See Mallory, supra note 20, at 178. According to the Russian theory of absolute immunity, a
state possesses jurisdictional immunity. This means that one state is not subject to the jurisdiction of
another state. A foreign state cannot be sued in court as a respondent without its consent. A state’s
jurisdictional immunity includes:
a) jurisdictional immunity in the narrow sense of the word— one state’s nonjurisdiction from
another’s courts;
b) immunity from preliminary security for a suit;
c) immunity from compulsory enforcement of judicial decisions.
Id. at 178 n.39.
36. See Watts, supra note 11, at 57. The state of the law as to the immunity of heads of state is
currently unsettled. George, supra note 8, at 1052. In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Id. at 1051. The Act embodied a restrictive theory of immunity, mandating that
“immunity would attach only to inherently governmental or public acts of a state.” Id. The Act,
however, was silent with regards to the immunity of heads of state. Id.
United States courts have taken divergent approaches to head of state immunity claims. Id. at
1064. On one side, we have the absolute immunity view advocated by the U.S. State Department. This
view is represented by the Lafontant v. Aristide case. See George, supra note 8, at 1065-66 (citing
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)). The plaintiff in this case sought monetary
compensation for the killing of her husband by Haitian soldiers. Id. at 1065. The soldiers were
allegedly acting under the orders of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Id. The State Department
intervened, suggesting that Aristide be given immunity because of his status as the Haitian head of
state. Id. The court promptly dismissed the action. Id. For other cases following the Aristide rationale,
see George, supra note 8, at 1066-67 (citing Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d
sub. nom Kodic v. Daradzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d 1995); Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp.
379 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
The other view is one of restrictive immunity for heads of state under an expansive interpretation
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See George, supra note 8, at 1070. Under this
interpretation, sovereign immunity under the FSIA extends to heads of state as well as to states. Id.
Accordingly, individuals acting in an official capacity cannot be sued. Id. In In re Estate of Marcos, a
suit was brought against the former President Marcos of the Philippines by the families of people who
allegedly had been tortured and executed under his authority. See George, supra note 8, at 1074 (citing
In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)). The estate’s principal argument was that
Marcos’s actions were non-justiciable because they were official or public acts. Id. The court
concluded that FSIA immunity did not apply because Marcos’s human rights violations did not qualify
as official acts of a head of state. Id. The court reasoned that because Marcos’s acts were not taken
with any official mandate, they were not the acts of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
within the meaning of the FSIA. Id. at 1074-75. By analyzing the FSIA’s potential applicability to
Marcos, the court implied that the FSIA could apply to certain situations. Id. at 1075.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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respect to acts that are essentially private in character.37
On the other hand, head of state immunity is still absolute with respect to
criminal proceedings initiated in the domestic legal systems of other states.38
Absolute immunity also extends to former heads of state so long as the acts
which are subject to criminal prosecution were official acts performed in the
head of state’s public capacity.39 This immunity is qualified when a head of
state commits certain international wrongs of a serious nature, such as war
crimes and genocide.40 Nonetheless, head of state immunity has endured as a
viable doctrine due to the lack of consensus on what acts constitute
international crimes and the inability of national courts to prosecute such
crimes.41 However, General Pinochet’s actions while ruler of Chile, and a
Spanish judge’s attempt to hold him accountable, have suddenly changed the
head of state immunity equation.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE PINOCHET REGIME
In September of 1970, Salvador Allende, a Socialist candidate, was
elected to power in Chile by winning a closely contested election.42 The
United States opposed the Allende regime and the CIA was ordered to find
means to depose him.43 The CIA then established close ties with other
military leaders in South America, and the United States levied economic
sanctions aimed primarily at much of the middle class in Chile.44
External factors, such as the United States’ embargo, and internal factors,
37. See Watts, supra note 11, at 55.
38. See id. at 54. See also id. at 54 n.82 (citing Re Honecker, 80 I.L.R. 365 (F.R.G. Fed. Sup. Ct.
(Second Criminal Chamber (1984)); id. at 57 n.91 (citing Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 2
H.L.C. 1 (1848) (holding that a foreign sovereign cannot be held responsible in another country for a
sovereign act done in his own country regardless of whether the act was right or wrong)).
39. See id. at 89.
40. See id. at 54. A head of state’s criminal responsibility for certain international crimes has
been expressed in the following instruments: Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (1946), Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East (1946), Article IV of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948), Article 3 of the UN Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (1954), Article III of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993),
Article 6(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), Article 27 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM:
THE PINOCHET CASE— UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND THE ABSENCE OF IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 29, 31 (1999).
41. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1312 (1998).
42. Nehal Bhuta, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pinochet, 23 MELB. U. L. REV.
499, 504 (1999).
43. Id. at 505.
44. Id. at 505-06.
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such as an active political opposition that deadlocked the government,
created the conditions for General Pinochet’s military coup against the
Allende government in September of 1973.45 The military junta under
Pinochet quickly established control over all branches of government.46
Furthermore, Pinochet took extensive measures to silence any opposition by
banning and dismissing political and local governing entities and curtailing
civil liberties.47 Finally, Pinochet imposed a general state of emergency
which forced the Chilean people to live under martial law until 1978.48
Many of the Pinochet regime’s human rights violations occurred during
the first few months after Pinochet took power, from September to December
of 1973.49 During that period, 13,500 people were arrested and possibly
1,500 were killed.50 The regime established detention camps throughout
Chile and torture soon became commonplace with respect to arrests and
detentions.51 In addition, the regime carried out political executions against
former members of the Allende government and anyone else deemed to be a
danger.52
Shortly after the coup, Pinochet took over the newly created position of
President and Commander in Chief of the Republic, concentrating most of
the government’s powers in him.53 In 1974, Pinochet created the National
Intelligence Directorate (DINA) to plan and execute operations against
insurgent elements in the population.54 The DINA was primarily responsible
for the repressive activities carried out from 1974 to 1977.55 DINA’s tactics
were aimed at quelling the activities of subversives through abduction,
torture, and execution.56
Pinochet also established cooperative ventures with the security forces of
other dictatorships in the area to exchange information about and coordinate
operations against Communist and Marxist subversives.57 “Operation
Condor” was the name given to the joint venture with Argentina, Bolivia,
45. See id. at 506.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 506-07.
48. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 507.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. See also REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION (1992) at 128-32 [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
52. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 507; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at 641.
53. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 507.
54. See id.
55. See id. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at 629.
56. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 507.
57. See id.
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Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil.58 In addition to dealing with Communists
and Marxists, Operation Condor created special forces from member
countries to eliminate terrorists and subversives in countries outside the joint
venture.59 For example, through Operation Condor, DINA directed the
assassination of former members of the ousted Allende government that had
fled to other countries.60
Human rights violations decreased significantly from 1977 to 1980 when
Pinochet dissolved the DINA and lifted the state of emergency.61 However,
after 1980 DINA’s successor, the National Centre for Information (CNI),
also engaged in repressive activity in response to terrorist attacks by leftist
groups.62 Detention, torture, and disappearance of government opponents
again became commonplace.63 The CNI also employed excessive force in
putting down mass protests and demonstrations that erupted after an
economic crisis in 1983.64 This repression did not go unnoticed, and the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights summarily condemned the
Pinochet regime in 1985.65 The Commission concluded that the Pinochet
regime had used all known means generally considered illegal under
international law to eliminate all opposition to his government.66
In 1981, a new constitution was drafted to allow a transition from the
military government of Pinochet to a democratically elected government.67 In
1988, the people of Chile had an opportunity to vote for Pinochet as
president, validating military rule for another eight years.68 However, the
people rejected Pinochet and paved the way for the military to turn power
over to a freely-elected government.69
Pinochet finally stepped down in March of 1990.70 Attempts to bring him
to justice for his actions, however, met with little success due to amnesty
58. Id.
59. See id. at 508.
60. See id. For example, former Minister of Defense Orlando Letelier was assassinated by a car
bomb in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976. Id.
61. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 508.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Status of Human
Rights in Chile, 14 I.L.M. 115, 115 (1975). The report documents practices such as disappearances,
summary executions of individuals and groups of defenseless persons, executions without legal
safeguards, torture, and arbitrary, indiscriminate violence against persons partaking in public
demonstrations or protests. Id.
67. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 509.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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laws passed during his regime.71 The Chilean courts have consistently upheld
these laws to prevent the prosecution of human rights violations,72 despite the
widespread view that international law requires Chile to prosecute such
conduct.73 Military courts loyal to Pinochet have also thwarted the effort to
prosecute human rights violations by asserting jurisdiction over officers
accused of such conduct.74 Finally, Pinochet himself enjoys immunity by
virtue of his position as “Senator-for-Life,” which he assumed after stepping
down as Commander in Chief in March of 1998.75
The carnage that Pinochet left behind in Chile is well documented. The
71. Decree Law No. 2191 was passed in April of 1978 and granted amnesty to any individual
who had committed criminal actions between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978 (the period of
the official state of emergency in Chile). AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 5.
72. In 1990, the Supreme Court of Chile upheld the 1978 amnesty law as constitutionally valid.
Id. It was argued that the amnesty laws were constitutionally invalid because international law required
the diligent prosecution of certain conduct that violated international human rights law. Bhuta, supra
note 42, at 510 n.74. The Court dismissed these arguments as invalid despite amendments enacted in
1988 which obligated the Chilean government to act in accordance with its obligations under
international human rights treaties ratified by Chile. See id. The relevant international conventions
cited before the Supreme Court to which Chile is a party are the following: Geneva Convention on the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for
signature August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force October 21, 1950); Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, opened for signature August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force October 21, 1950);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature August 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force October 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entered into force October 21, 1949); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, opened for signature December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12,
1951). See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 510 n.74.
73. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that despite the
amnesty law, Chile’s failure to investigate and prosecute cases of disappearance, summary execution,
and torture violated Chile’s duties and obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights.
See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 510 n.74 (citing case [36/96], Inter-Am. C.H.R. [157-83], OEA/Ser.
L./V./II.95 (1996). The Human Rights Committee, a body charged with monitoring and enforcing the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), also held that Chile’s amnesty law
was a violation of its obligations under international human rights law. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39, at 5. See also id. at 5 (citing Hugo Rodriguez, Communication No.
322/1988 (July 19, 1994), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988).
74. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 510. Military courts staffed by former and currently serving
members of the armed forces are deeply loyal to Pinochet and are not disposed to convict members of
the armed forces accused of human rights violations under the Pinochet regime. Id. See also id. at 510
n.78 (citing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Status of Human Rights in
Chile, 14 I.L.M. 115, 115 (1975)); Nigel Rodley, Report on Visit by the Special Rapporteur to Chile,
Special Rappoteur on the Question of Torture of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at
62, 68, 74, 76 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.2 (1996).
75. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 6. See also Bhuta, supra note 42, at 510-11.
The immunity can only be rescinded by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at
511 (citing Penal Procedure Code (Chile) arts. 611-18). That immunity is unlikely to be rescinded in
the near future considering the Supreme Court’s long history of siding with Pinochet and the military
government. Id. See also COMMISION REPORT, supra note 51, at 135-36.
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Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation76 concluded that
over 2,000 people were killed in violation of their human rights.77 In the
Commission’s final report,78 the government of Chile officially
acknowledged over 3,000 cases of human rights abuses.79 Independent
investigations by private non-governmental organizations have placed the
figure even higher, recording over 11,500 human rights abuses.80 Although
efforts to bring Pinochet to justice in Chile have been unsuccessful, the
victims’ families and human rights organizations hold Pinochet accountable,
refusing to be deterred by the amnesty laws.81 In September 1998, their
perseverance paid off as a golden opportunity to hold Pinochet responsible
finally emerged.
IV. SPANISH JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS TO EXTRADITE PINOCHET
In March and July of 1996, the Progressive Union of Prosecutors of
Spain, together with private organizations,82 filed criminal proceedings in
Spanish courts charging Argentine and Chilean military officers with the
“disappearances of Spanish citizens in both countries.”83 The complaint also
76. The Commission was established by President Patricio Aylwin under Supreme Decree 335 of
April 1990. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 4.
77. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 508. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51, at app. 2.
Approximately fifty percent of the deaths that were deemed human rights violations are broken down
as follows: (1) 59 people sentenced to death by military courts; (2) 101 people killed attempting to
escape prison; (3) 93 people killed during protests and demonstrations; (4) 815 people killed by
execution or torture. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 508. Disappearances attributable to the State accounted
for over forty-five percent of the human rights violations (957 people). Id. Of the victims, over forty-
five percent had no political affiliations. Id.
78. The Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation, established by President Aylwin in 1992 as
the successor to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, issued the final report in 1996. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 4.
79. The final breakdown of the violations are as follows: 2,095 summary executions and deaths
by torture and 1,102 disappearances for a total of 3,197 human rights violations. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 40, at 4.
80. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 509. The Chilean non-governmental organization Comite Nacional
de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo documented some 11,536 human rights violations between
1984-88. These violations included 163 murders, 446 instances of torture, and 1,927 arbitrary arrests.
Bhuta, supra note 42, at 509, 509 n.64 (citing JAMES PETRAS, FERNANDO LEIVA, AND HENRY
VELTMEYER, DEMOCRACY AND POVERTY IN CHILE: THE LIMITS TO ELECTORAL POLITICS (1994) 21).
81. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 511.
82. Spanish law allows private citizens and organizations to initiate criminal proceedings without
the approval of the prosecutor’s office and regardless of whether or not the complaining party is a
victim of the crime. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 511. The United Left, a Spanish political party, and
the Argentine Association for Human Rights in Madrid initiated the actions against the Argentinian
military officers. The Salvador Allende Foundation and the Chilean Group of Relatives of Detained
and Disappeared People initiated the actions against the Chilean military officers. See Carassco &
Fernandez, infra note 83, at 691 n.8.
83. Maria del Carmen Marquez Carrasco & Joaquin Alcaide Fernandez, In re Pinochet, 93 AM. J.
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included allegations of genocide, terrorism, and crimes against humanity.84 In
June 1996, Judge Baltazar Garzon held that the Court had jurisdiction to
investigate the allegations in the complaint.85 On September 22, 1998,
Pinochet traveled to the United Kingdom to undergo back surgery.86 Upon
hearing of Pinochet’s presence in the United Kingdom, Judge Garzon
requested Scotland Yard to arrest Pinochet pursuant to international arrest
warrants87 issued for the purpose of extraditing him and bringing him back to
Spain.88 On October 16, 1998, Pinochet was arrested and detained at a
hospital in London where he was recovering from surgery.89
The Spanish Public Prosecutor90 appealed Judge Garzon’s finding of
jurisdiction, and the Criminal Division of the Spanish National Court
considered the question.91 The Court unanimously held that Spain had
jurisdiction to try crimes of genocide, terrorism, and torture committed
abroad by the Argentine and Chilean defendants.92 Although the acts
committed by Pinochet took place in Chile and most of the victims were not
Spanish citizens, the Court relied on the principle of universal jurisdiction93
INT’L L. 690, 691 (1999). More than 300 Spanish citizens were killed by the military regimes of
Argentina and Chile. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 511.
84. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 512.
85. Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 691. Initially, the proceedings against Argentine and
Chilean military officers were under separate judges. Judge Garcia-Castellon had previously accepted
the case with respect to the allegations against Chilean military officers in February of 1997. In
September of 1998, he held that he had jurisdiction to investigate the case. After Pinochet was arrested
pursuant to Judge Garzon’s warrant, Judge Garcia-Castellon ordered the cases combined and
consolidated under the supervision of Judge Garzon. Id. at 692. See also Bhuta, supra note 42, at 512.
86. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2133 (1999).
87. The first international arrest warrant issued on October 16, 1998 charged Pinochet with the
murder of Spanish citizens in Chile between 1973 and 1983. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86,
at 2133. The second international warrant issued by Judge Garzon on October 22, 1998, charged
Pinochet with “acts of torture, hostage taking, and other conduct committed primarily . . . against
Chilean citizens in Chile.” Id.
88. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 692. Judge Garzon issued the order in response
to a request by the United Left Party to question Pinochet concerning his role in Operation Condor in
which Argentine and Chilean military officers were charged with the abduction and disappearance of
Spanish citizens. Id.
89. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 513.
90. The Public Prosecutor’s Office is not designed to adhere to the policies and views of the
government. Its duty is to promote justice in an impartial manner by defending citizens’ rights and the
public interest as established by law. Therefore, with respect to criminal proceedings, the office is not
only required to bring criminal and civial actions, but is also required to oppose proceedings brought
by others when appropriate. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 690 n.4.
91. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 512.
92. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 690.
93. Generally, international law requires that a nation exerting jurisdiction outside its territory
must have some connection with the illegal conduct or the person charged with such conduct.
Universal jurisdiction, however, recognizes that certain types of conduct or crimes can be regulated by
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as a basis for requesting his extradition.94 Under Spanish law, courts can
exercise criminal jurisdiction over genocide,95 terrorism,96 torture,97 and any
other crime regulated by international treaties— even if committed by foreign
citizens abroad.98 The Court also noted that Spain had a legitimate interest in
any nation. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2133. See generally Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988). The theory behind this
type of jurisdiction is that all nations have an interest in punishing such conduct because people who
engage in such conduct are “hostis humani generis” or “enemies of all mankind.” Bradley and
Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2133-34. See also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the
Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 416-17 (1988).
94. Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 690-91.
95. The crime of genocide became part of the Spanish penal code in 1971. The substantive
elements of the crime were incorporated from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (hereinafter “Genocide Convention”). Spain
ratified the Genocide Convention in 1968. The Public Prosecutor first argued that Article VI of the
Genocide Convention gave exclusive jurisdiction over genocide to the state where the crime took place
or an international tribunal. The Court rejected the Prosecutor’s arguments, holding that Article VI
only imposes an obligation to prosecute on states where genocide has taken place. Spanish claims to
jurisdiction were subsidiary. Because neither Chile nor an international tribunal was willing to try the
crime, Spanish courts were not hindered from asserting jurisdiction. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra
note 83, at 693.
The Public Prosecutor also argued that the alleged acts committed by Pinochet could not
constitute genocide because the acts were “not intended to destroy any national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.” The Prosecution based its argument on the definition contained in the Genocide
Convention. However, the definition in the Spanish Criminal Code was amended in 1983 by replacing
the word “social” with “racial.” Relying on this definition, the Court held that the “national” or “social
group” that Pinochet was trying to eliminate consisted of all people who were opposed to the regime.
For the Court, a “national group” did not necessarily mean people of the same nation. It might simply
be a group of humans defined by common characteristics. Thus, such a group could include Spanish
citizens. According to the Court, Pinochet’s alleged acts were aimed at destroying in whole or in part a
distinct national group, i.e. a group that opposed the regime or was considered unsuitable to the regime
in establishing the new order. Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 693.
The Court’s interpretation of a national group, however, deviates from the generally recognized
definition. Genocide has been limited to acts aimed at destroying a “national, ethnic, racial or religious
group.” Id. at 695. Political groups were not included in the definition and subsequent international
practice in the form of the Yugoslav and Rwandan criminal tribunals has not expanded this notion. The
group described by the Court as falling within the genocide definition better fits the category of
political group. The acts committed by Pinochet are better characterized as crimes against humanity,
which are also subject to universal jurisdiction under international law. See id. at 694-95.
96. “Spanish law contained no definition of terrorism for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.”
Id. at 693. The Prosecutor argued that Spanish courts only have jurisdiction over acts of terrorism
committed against the Spanish public order. The Court rejected this notion and held that the intention
to destabilize the national order required for the crime of terrorism was the national order of the
country where the acts of terrorism took place. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 693-94.
97. With respect to the claims for torture, the Court held that it was unnecessary to find an
independent basis for jurisdiction because torture fell under the larger crimes of genocide and
terrorism. See Carrasco and Fernandez, supra note 83, at 694.
98. Article 23 (4) of Spain’s Organic Law of Judicial Power provides in pertinent part:
In addition Spanish Courts have jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by Spanish subjects
or foreigners abroad if those acts are likely to be considered, according to the Spanish criminal
legislation, as any of the following crimes:
(a) genocide,
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exerting jurisdiction, considering that over 550 Spanish citizens disappeared
or were killed by the military regimes of Argentina and Chile.99 As a result of
the Court’s ruling, the Spanish government officially transmitted its request
to the British government for the extradition of Pinochet.100
V. BRITISH JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CONSIDERING THE EXTRADITION OF
PINOCHET
A. Queen’s Bench Division Decision
Pinochet challenged his arrest and sought habeas corpus relief in the
Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division.101 The Court dismissed the
first international arrest warrant, which cited the murder of Spanish citizens
in Chile, on the grounds that it did not amount to an extraditable crime under
British law.102 The Court held, however, that the second international arrest
(b) terrorism,
(c) piracy and unlawful seizure of aircraft . . .
(d) and any other which according to international treaties or conventions must be prosecuted in
Spain.
Id. at 692 n.14 (quoting Article 23(4) of the Ley Organica del Poder Judicial (L.A.P.J. 1985)).
99. See Carrasco & Fernandez, supra note 83, at 691.
100. See id. at 692.
101. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2136; Chinkin, supra note 2, at 704.
102. See In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 68, 77 (1999). A request for extradition under the United
Kingdom’s Extradition Act of 1989 may only be considered if the alleged crimes committed by the
defendant are extradition crimes. An extradition crime is defined in section 2(1) of the Act as the
following:
(a) conduct in the territory of a foreign state . . . which, if it occurred in the United Kingdom,
would constitute an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater
punishment, and which, however described in the law of the foreign state, . . . is so punishable
under that law;
(b) an extra-territorial offense against the law of a foreign state . . . which is punishable under that
law with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment . . . .
In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 72 (quoting Sections 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) of the Extradition Act of 1989).
Because the international arrest warrant cited the murder of Spanish citizens in Chile, the extradition
request fell under Section 2(1)(b) of the Act. However, before an extradition request could proceed
under Section 2(1)(b), conditions in either Section 2(2) or 2(3) needed to be satisfied. They are as
follows:
[2(2)] The condition mentioned . . . above is that in corresponding circumstances equivalent
conduct would constitute an extra-territorial offence against the law of the United Kingdom
punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment.
 . . . .
[2(3)] (a) that the foreign state . . . bases its jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender;
(b) that the conduct constituting the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom; and
(c) that, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would constitute an offence under the law of the
United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months or any greater
punishment.
In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 72 (citing Sections 2(2) and 2(3)(a)-(c) of the Extradition Act of 1989).
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warrant103 issued by Judge Garzon did cite valid extradition crimes under
British Law.104 Accordingly, the United Kingdom could claim extra-
territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad that were listed in the
warrant.105
The decisive issue before the Court was the head of state immunity
argument posited by Pinochet’s lawyers. With respect to this argument, the
Court held that Pinochet was entitled to immunity as a former head of state
from criminal and civil proceedings in the United Kingdom.106 The Court
reasoned that the State Immunity Act of 1978 conferred immunity on
Pinochet for acts performed in his official capacity.107 The Court further
The international arrest warrant could not be predicated on Section 2(3) because Spain was not basing
its jurisdiction on the nationality of Pinochet, a Chilean citizen, but on the nationality of the victims.
Thus, the Court held that all the conditions in Section 2(3) were not satisfied. See id. at. 77. The Court
further held that the warrant did not satisfy Section 2(2) because Britain could not claim extra-
territorial jurisdiction over an offense involving the murder of a British national by a non-national
outside the United Kingdom. See id.
103. The second warrant alleged the following five offenses: (1) that between January of 1988 and
December of 1992, Pinochet “intentionally inflicted severe pain or suffering” in the performance of his
official, public duties; (2) Pinochet conspired to commit such crimes between those dates; (3) that
between January 1, 1982 and January 31, 1992, Pinochet ordered the detention of hostages; (4)
between those dates Pinochet conspired to commit such crime; and (5) that between January 1976 and
December 1992, Pinochet conspired to commit murder in a Convention country. In re Pinochet, 38
I.L.M. at 77.
104. See id. at 79. The actions in counts one and two of the warrant were proscribed by Section
134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988. The actions relating to hostage taking in counts three and four
were prohibited by Section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982. Finally, conspiracy to commit
murder, alleged in the fifth count, was regulated by Section 4 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act of
1978. It would be a criminal offense to commit certain acts in countries that signed the Convention if
those acts would also be offenses in the United Kingdom. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 85.
107. Id. at. 82. The Court relied on the following sections of the State Immunity Act of 1978 to
confer immunity on Pinochet:
[Section] 1: A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except
as provided in the following provisions of this Part of this Act.
[Section] 14(1) . . . The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to any
foreign or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and references to a State include
references to –
(a) a sovereign or other head of state in his public capacity; . . .
Section 20(1) . . . Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifications, the
Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 shall apply to -- (a) a sovereign or other head of State.
In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 80 (quoting Sections 1, 14(1), and 20(1) of the State Immunity Act of
1978). The Court then looked to the following provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, which is incorporated into the aforementioned Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 in Section
20(1) of the State Immunity Act of 1978:
[Article 31(1)]: A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, . . . .
 . . . .
[Article 39(1)]: Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the
moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceedings to take up his post or, if
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reasoned that the rule of international relations “restraining one sovereign
state from sitting in judgment on the sovereign behaviour of another” clearly
entitled Pinochet to immunity, even with respect to “criminal acts performed
in the course of exercising public functions.”108 According to the Court,
Pinochet should enjoy immunity from all acts performed in his public
function because it would be difficult to “draw the line” of liability with
respect to some crimes and not to others.109
B. First House of Lords Decision (November 1998)
The Court delayed enforcement of its order quashing the two warrants
and granted Britain’s Crown Prosecution Service leave to appeal the decision
to the House of Lords.110 In response to the Court’s decision, Spain issued
another extradition request which expanded the number and scope of the
crimes committed by Pinochet, adding “among other things, a charge of
genocide.”111 Finally, understanding the potential importance of this
already in its territory, from the moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, February 25, 1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112, 118 (quoted in
In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 81). The Court read Section 20(1) of the State Immunity Act of 1978 and
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in conjunction with each other to confer
on Pinochet immunity for public and official acts performed in his country. See In re Pinochet, 38
I.L.M. at 83.
108. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 83. The Court cited to several authoritative sources for the
proposition that Pinochet enjoyed total immunity with respect to acts performed in his official
capacity. For example, the Court pointed out that according to Lewis’s STATE AND DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY “[t]he sovereign’s personal immunity at common law, whereby he may not be directly
impleaded, is total, though he may waive it by an actual submission . . .” Id. at 83 (quoting CHARLES J.
LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 125 (3rd ed. 1990). The Court also referred to Professor
Brownlie’s statements in PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, where he writes: “One form of
the Act of State doctrine is the rule that municipal courts will not pass on the validity of the acts of
foreign governments performed in their capacities as sovereigns within their own territories.” Id. at 83
(quoting IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 507-08 (3d ed. 1979)).
Pinochet was not charged with “personally torturing victims . . . or causing their disappearance.”
Instead, Pinochet used the authority and machinery of the State to carry out the crimes; as such, these
crimes were committed under the authority of the government and were thus public or official acts. See
In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 82.
The Court rejected the Crown Prosecution Service’s argument that a former head of state can be
held criminally responsible for serious crimes against the law of nations such as genocide and torture.
The Court pointed out that the specific provision of the Genocide Convention conferring liability on
rulers and public officials was not incorporated into the United Kingdom’s Genocide Act of 1969, the
Act that implemented the Genocide Convention in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the second provisional warrant did not specify genocide as one of the offenses. In re Pinochet, 38
I.L.M. at 83-84.
109. Id. at 83.
110. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2136.
111. Id.
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decision, the House of Lords granted leave for human rights groups such as
Amnesty International to intervene in the appeal.112
On November 25, a five-member panel of the House of Lords, in a
narrow three to two decision, held that Pinochet was not entitled to head of
state immunity.113 The majority did note that a former head of state was
immune from criminal prosecution for acts performed in his official capacity
as head of state.114 The majority reasoned, however, that acts “condemned as
criminal by international law”115 cannot “amount to acts performed in the
exercise of the [official] functions of a head of state.”116 Because hostage-
taking and torture have been outlawed by international law, they cannot
constitute official functions of a head of state for which Pinochet should be
granted immunity.117
The dissent rejected the notion that certain crimes abrogate head of state
immunity.118 The fact that particular offenses were recognized as illegal
112. See id.
113. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1334 (Lord Nicholls), 1338 (Lord Steyn), 1339 (Lord
Hoffman) (1998).
114. See id. at 1337 (Lord Steyn).
115. Id. at 1333 (Lord Nicholls). Lord Nicholls noted that torture and hostage-taking were illegal
under international law. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, J. HERMAN BURGERS AND HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, 177 App. 1 (1988);
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1456 (1979) (reproduced from U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979)). In reasoning that former officials should not be immune from prosecution,
Lord Nicholls noted that these conventions obligated states to punish such crimes in their own courts
even if the crimes were committed outside their own jurisdiction. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. at
1334. Finally, in underscoring that torture and hostage-taking cannot constitute official acts of a head
of state, Lord Nicholls emphasized that “international law has made plain that certain types of conduct
. . . are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even
more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international
law.” Id. at 1333.
116. Id. at 1337 (Lord Steyn). Lord Steyn disagreed with the decision in the Queen’s Bench that
no line could be drawn with respect to immunity for the commission of certain crimes. He noted that
statutory immunity was not total and absolute, but required the existence of two factors: (1) the
defendant is in fact a former head of state and (2) the defendant is charged with official acts performed
by virtue of his functions as head of state. Id. According to Lord Steyn, the key question was whether
the acts complained of in the warrant could constitute official or public acts performed in the exercise
of the functions and powers of a head of state. Lord Steyn noted that municipal law did not govern the
issue of whether or not certain offenses fell under the category of official acts. Rather, international
law was decisive in determining whether certain offenses were official acts warranting immunity from
prosecution. Id. at 1337. With respect to the crimes of torture and hostage-taking, Lord Steyn stated:
“it seems to me difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts
performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of state.” Id.
117. Id. at 1334 (Lord Nicholls). For the agreements outlawing torture and hostage taking, see
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra
note 115, at 177; Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 115, at 1456.
118. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. at 1312 (Lord Slynn), 1323-24 (Lord Lloyd).
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under international law did not mean that all states would have the
competence and jurisdiction to try those offenses.119 To the dissent, head of
state immunity was a well-established principle of customary international
law which could only be abrogated by treaty or waived by the state of
nationality.120 Thus, a head of state that uses his public authority to engage in
conduct proscribed by international law could still claim immunity with
respect to that conduct.121
C. Second House of Lords Decision (March 1999)
The first House of Lords decision represented a momentous victory for
human rights groups. That victory was short-lived, however, because the
House of Lords vacated the judgment in light of an undisclosed conflict of
interest of one of the Law Lords deciding the case.122 A seven-member panel
of the House of Lords reheard the appeal. Chile intervened to argue for
Pinochet’s release.123
Before addressing the issue of head of state immunity, the House of Lords
119. See id. at 1313 (Lord Slynn).
120. See id. at 1313-14 (Lord Slynn), 1324-25 (Lord Lloyd). Lord Slynn established the following
three elements which must be satisfied before head of state immunity can be expressly abrogated:
(1) “[t]he convention must clearly define a crime against international law and require or empower
a state to prevent or prosecute the crime, whether or not committed in its jurisdiction and whether
or not committed by one of its nationals; (2) it must make it clear that a National Court has
jurisdiction to try a crime alleged against a former head of state, or that having been a head of state
is no defense and that expressly or impliedly the immunity is not to apply so as to bar proceedings
against him; and (3) the convention must be given the force of law in the National Courts of the
State.
Id. at 1313-14 (Lord Slynn).
Lord Slynn noted that the Genocide Convention did not expressly abrogate head of state
immunity. When Britain enacted the Genocide Act of 1969 to implement the Genocide Convention, it
did not incorporate Article IV of the Genocide Convention. Article IV states that heads of state and
other public officials are individually responsible for committing acts of genocide. See id. at 1311-12
(Lord Slynn).
Lord Slynn argued that the Torture Convention did not expressly indicate that it applied to heads
of state. Even though the Torture Convention does impute liability to public officials, Lord Slynn
noted the absence of the term “head of state” or “ruler” is present in the Genocide Convention.
Accordingly, the Torture Convention did not give enough guidance as to whether heads of state were
to be regarded as public officials for purposes of the Convention. Therefore, head of state immunity
was not expressly abrogated by the Convention. See id. at 1315 (Lord Slynn).
121. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. at 1309 (Lord Lloyd).
122. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 519. Lord Hoffman failed to disclose that he was an unpaid
director of one of Amnesty International’s fund-raising arms. Amnesty International had intervened in
the first case before the House of Lords. Although Lord Hoffman did not have any financial interest at
stake in the case, the appearance of impartiality seemed tainted. As a result, the Lords dismissed the
case as a matter of law. Id. at 519. See generally In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430 (1999) (decision to
dismiss).
123. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2137.
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dismissed a significant portion of the extradition charges against Pinochet.124
The House of Lords unanimously held that the extradition statute required
the extraterritorial conduct to be illegal under British law at the time the
alleged offenses took place.125 Great Britain implemented the Torture
Convention and made torture an extraterritorial crime in September of
1988.126 Therefore, all charges concerning torture before this date could not
serve as a valid basis for extradition.127
The House of Lords next considered the issue of immunity with respect to
the remaining offenses, charges relating to torture and conspiracy to commit
torture after September 1988.128 The House of Lords recognized that under
both British and international law, “Pinochet was generally entitled to
immunity” for criminal acts undertaken “while carrying out his duties as
head of state.”129 However, the Law Lords held that “former-head-of-state
immunity did not cover acts of torture and conspiracy to commit torture
committed after December 8, 1988, the date Britain ratified the Torture
Convention.”130 Despite their holding, however, the Law Lords suggested
that “the Home Secretary should reconsider . . . the extradition proceedings
in light of the substantial reduction in [the number and] scope of the
charges.”131
VI. THE PINOCHET PRECEDENT AND HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
The House of Lords’ holding that Pinochet enjoyed no immunity as a
former head of state represents a significant “shift from a State-centered
124. Id. See also Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 582-83 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 597 (Lord
Goff), 621 (Lord Hope) (1999). As noted earlier, offenses under the British extradition statute must
meet the double criminality requirement before they can constitute the basis for extradition. Double
criminality means that the conduct complained of would have to constitute not only an extraterritorial
offense against the requesting state, but also against the law of the United Kingdom. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2137-38.
125. Id. at 2138. See also Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 588 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 613
(Lord Hope), 627 (Lord Hutton). Both the divisional court and the first House of Lords decision
concluded with minimal analysis that the double criminality requirement was met. They both
concluded that the offenses alleged could constitute a basis for extradition as long as the conduct was
considered criminal under British law at the time the extradition request was made. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2138.
126. See id. See also Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 618 (Lord Hope).
127. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2138. See also Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at
618-19 (Lord Hope).
128. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2138.
129. Id. at 2138-39.
130. Id.
131. Id. See also Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 595 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 627 (Lord
Hope), 643 (Lord Hutton), 652 (Lord Millett).
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order of things.”132 The Pinochet decision could be interpreted to carve out a
new exception to head of state immunity for criminal acts of a non-official
character. This would mirror the distinction that is currently made with
respect to the issue of immunity in civil and administrative proceedings.
Thus, a new rule for criminal liability would give a head of state immunity
for official acts performed in public capacity. The rule would further classify
acts proscribed by international law as non-official acts to which immunity
could not attach.
The House of Lords’ rationale for denying Pinochet immunity, however,
does not create such a clear-cut exception. The judgment denying Pinochet
immunity could be narrowly limited to the specific terms and purposes of the
Torture Convention.133 In fact, a close reading of the decision seems to favor
the latter interpretation instead of the view that head of state immunity is
abrogated when certain international crimes are involved.
The Pinochet decision seems to have made the law more “open-ended
and uncertain.”134 The best illustration of this uncertainty is the Law Lords’
assertion that current heads of state would enjoy absolute immunity for acts
of torture even after the implementation of the Torture Convention.135 It is
unclear why a former head of state’s immunity should be abrogated for acts
of torture and a current head of state’s immunity should remain intact.136
Despite the lack of any clear rule emerging from the House of Lords’
decision, the Pinochet case has already had a practical impact on the doctrine
of head of state immunity. In the short period of time since Judge Garzon
brought charges against Pinochet, Belgium137 and France138 have also
instituted proceedings against Pinochet. The Pinochet prosecution has also
inspired other countries to hold former dictators accountable for their crimes.
For example, on February 3, 2000, the government of Senegal indicted
Chad’s ex-dictator on torture charges.139
132. Fox, supra note 4, at 207 (footnote omitted).
133. Bhuta, supra note 42, at 530.
134. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2140.
135. See id. at 2144.
136. See id. at 2144. In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia has made it clear
that current heads of state are not immune from prosecution for serious international crimes committed
while in office. In May of 1999, the Tribunal indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for
crimes arising out of his treatment of the Kosavars in Kosovo. Milosevic Indictment Makes History, at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9905/27/kosovo.milosevic.04/ (visited Mar. 7, 2001).
137. For a short summary of Belgian proceedings against Pinochet, see Luc Reydams, In re
Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 700, 700-03 (1999).
138. For a short summary of French proceedings against Pinochet, see Brigitte Stern, In re
Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 696, 696-700 (1999).
139. Chad’s former dictator, Hissene Habre, has been in exile in Senegal since he fled Chad in
1990 after his ouster. A commission established by the government of Chad has accused Habre’s
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The Pinochet decision has not established a clear exception to head of
state immunity with respect to criminal proceedings. The decision does
represent a significant and necessary first step in the establishment of a new
rule of head of state immunity. As with any significant departure from
existing law, future judicial decisions and state practice must establish and
further refine the rule. In any event, the Pinochet decision will always be
looked upon as the watershed decision that circumscribed the immunity of
rulers accused of grave human rights violations.140
VII. EPILOGUE
In March of 2000, British Home Secretary, Jack Straw ruled that General
Pinochet would not be extradited to Spain.141 The Home Secretary’s decision
was based on medical tests indicating that Pinochet was unfit to stand trial.142
As a result, Pinochet was allowed to return home to Chile after more than
500 days in detention.143
Despite his return to Chile, Pinochet has not escaped justice. In May of
2000, a Chilean Appeals Court stripped Pinochet of his immunity for crimes
committed during his reign.144
Finally, in August of 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld the
appellate court decision to strip Pinochet of his immunity.145 As a result of
the removal of his immunity, more than 150 cases have been brought against
Pinochet in Chile.146
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regime of committing 40,000 political murders and 200,000 cases of torture. Senegal cited the
Pinochet prosecution and its obligation under the Torture Convention as support for its criminal
complaint against Chad’s former head of state. See Senegal Indicts Chad’s Ex-dictator on Torture
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140. See Bhuta, supra note 42, at 530.
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